[Psi-Devel] Off-the-Record messaging for Psi

[Timo Engel]

On 08-Oct-2007 Kevin Smith wrote:
[...]
> Sadly, using OTR in this way doesn't add very much security: if c2s  
> and s2s streams are encrypted anyway the only thing that end to end  
> encryption, like OTR, provides is protection against a malicious or  
> compromised server. OTR doesn't provide protection against this  
> (indeed, there's even an ejabberd module to automatically log  
> decrypted OTR messages) because there is no out-of-band verification.  
> If security isn't important, you could send it plain-text, and if it  
> is important OTR won't provide it, sadly.


OTR uses authentication with DSA keys. You can be sure there is no
man-in-the-middle attack. Of course, you have to verify the fingerprints of
the public keys. With other encryption protocols it's the same problem. 


timo.